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To the Anxious Humanities
Scholar
You are a humanities scholar and you are worried. You fear that the hu-
manities are increasingly seen as irrelevant, unnecessary and quaint.
You may even have begun to internalise this view. In the face of intrac-
table contemporary problems – global pandemics, economic crisis and a
climate emergency – how can your work seem like anything other than
an indulgence?
You hear the constant, ambient noise of public and political hostility
aimed at what you do. In January 2020 the prime minister’s chief ad-
viser, Dominic Cummings (a humanities graduate, like the prime minis-
ter), wrote a long blog post calling for ‘weirdos and misfits with odd
skills’ to apply for new jobs at No. 10 Downing Street. He made it clear
that he was looking for data scientists, software developers, economists
and policy experts, not ‘Oxbridge English graduates who chat about
Lacan at dinner parties with TV producers’.1 Later that month the
University of Sunderland announced that it would be shutting down
its history, languages and politics courses, and replacing them with
more ‘career-focused and professions-facing’ alternatives. In February
the University of Portsmouth revealed plans to make more than half
its English department redundant, citing the declining number of appli-
cations in this subject. In June 2020 the Australian education minister,
Dan Tehan, announced that his government wanted to double student
fees for courses in the arts and humanities while cutting them for nurs-
ing, agriculture, maths, science and information technology. The aim
was ‘to power our post-Covid economic recovery’ by sending out a ‘price
signal’ to encourage people to study in areas of growth.2 The UK govern-
ment made similar noises about pricing mechanisms and ending
funding for humanities courses considered poor value for money.
In August 2020 the A-level marking controversy, and the subsequent
scramble for university places, inspired much media comment about the
glut of worthless degrees in second-rate institutions, again focusing on
humanities subjects. ‘The universities are churning out far more gradu-
ates than our society requires,’ wrote one columnist, ‘particularly in sub-
jects like the creative arts and communications that have little
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relevance to the workplace.’3 The current right-wing critique of universi-
ties as indoctrination camps where students are ‘factory-farmed to have
the same boring and malevolent views’ has focused its ire on humanities
subjects.4
No wonder that, after reading these signs and portents, you feel be-
leaguered and dispirited. You crave some encouragement and cheer,
and a reminder of why you first fell in love with the texts you spend your
life examining. You need a story that will convince others, and yourself,
of the worth of your work.
The Humanities and the Real World
You may take heart from the knowledge that, while this particular crisis
is new, the issues are old. ‘The humanities are at the cross-roads, at a
crisis in their existence,’ the historian J.H. Plumb wrote in the introduc-
tion to his Pelican edited collection, Crisis in the Humanities, in 1964.
‘They must either change the image that they present, adapt themselves
to the needs of a society dominated by science and technology, or retreat
into social triviality.’5
This permanent crisis of identity and legitimacy in the humanities
arises partly out of definitional fuzziness. The humanities have often
been defined against something else – and against which they can be
found wanting. In the Renaissance the studia humanitatis were the sec-
ular subjects, such as rhetoric, philosophy and ancient Greek and Latin,
and thus the opposite of the highest form of study, divinity. Then, from
the mid-nineteenth century onwards, the humanities began to be de-
fined in opposition to the physical sciences. At first they were the senior
partner. Charles Darwin’s frequent biblical and literary allusions, and
the elegance of his own writing, show how influenced he was by the hu-
manities. But in the century after Darwin’s death, the sciences grew in
confidence and prestige. The main character in Saul Bellow’s 1987 novel
More Die of Heartbreak, a Russian literature specialist, feels as if he has
been confined to ‘the nursery games of humankind, which had to be left
behind when the age of science began’. The humanities, he thinks gloom-
ily, ‘would be called upon to choose a wallpaper for the crypt, as the end
drew near’.6
More recently, the humanities have come to seem like the poor rela-
tion of STEM. STEM is an acronym now routinely repurposed as both
noun and adjective (STEM skills, STEM subjects, STEM jobs). We forget
how new the acronym is and sometimes even what it stands for (science,
technology, engineering and mathematics). The OED gives its earliest
mention in print as 1968 but notes that it is ‘rare before 21st cent.’ In
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fact it began to be used widely in the US in the late 1990s, in debates
about skills shortages in high-tech jobs and access to work visas for
immigrants skilled in these fields. In Britain it has become an article
of faith among policy makers that investing in STEM is vital to economic
growth, especially in areas like life sciences, pharmaceuticals, computer
coding and electronic engineering.
The embattled scholar of the humanities may be tempted to lash out
defensively at this more glamorous sibling, STEM, who gets all the at-
tention and praise. In 2010 a novelist and creative writing lecturer
complained that ‘the humanities are being killed off […] The scientists
are winning […] The purpose of artists is to ask the right questions, even
if we don’t find the answers, whereas the aim of science is to prove some
dumb point.’7 Apart from letting off steam, such statements don’t help
much. We need a defence of the humanities that resists this tired trope
of the sciences as mechanical and dehumanising. It must begin with a
recognition that the humanities and sciences are of equal and incom-
mensurable value.
Part of what the humanities do is to explore how arguments are lim-
ited not by being ‘wrong’, but by being framed so as to make other argu-
ments unhearable. Behind the invoking of STEM as an urgent priority
lie several unexamined assumptions – none of which is necessarily false,
but all of which are a story being told about the world. The first is that
we are competing with other countries in a ‘skills race’ and we are falling
behind. The second is that the sciences and humanities are engaged in a
zero-sum game of competitive usefulness: if STEM is essential, then
other subjects must be less essential. The third is that a university is
not part of ‘the real world’, but a way of preparing students for that
world. Its intellectual currency has value only if it can be converted into
something usable elsewhere. Governments now insist on university
courses providing value for money, with graduate salaries being the
main assessment criterion. Measurable inputs (teaching hours, tuition
fees) must be matched with measurable outputs (jobs, increased
salaries).
Steven Shapin sheds light on this transactional idea of the university
by tracing the history of a phrase, ‘the Ivory Tower’. The Ivory Tower
never existed. It was only ever a figure of speech, a way of signalling
lofty detachment from the world, because ivory was so costly that its
main use was for art or religious iconography. The Ivory Tower began
as a religious metaphor, until nineteenth-century writers adapted it to
refer to the art world. Only in the second part of the twentieth century
did universities begin to be called Ivory Towers. University scientists
were increasingly doing applied research, contributing to the
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manufacture of drugs, weapons, herbicides and synthetic fibres. Those
scholars still doing non-applied research began to be accused of hiding
in Ivory Towers. By the 1970s the Ivory Tower was judged to be ‘an al-
most incontestably Bad Place’, one where elites retreated behind high
walls.8
In the UK, the Ivory Tower emerged as a metaphor just as universi-
ties became less cloistered and more engaged with the world. Before
the Second World War, when a tiny proportion of the population
attended a few universities or university colleges, dons had a comfort-
able but peripheral role in national life. In 1939 Britain had only 5,000
academics. By the end of the 1960s, with the arrival of the plate-glass
universities, the polytechnics and the Open University, the number
had risen to 40,000.9 In a process that A. H. Halsey calls ‘the decline of
donnish dominion’, universities ceased to be self-governing scholarly
guilds and became subject to external control over their teaching and
research, mainly through more organised competition for funding.
They were now habitually criticised for being detached from the ‘real
world’.
The American poet Richard Hugo worked for thirteen years as a tech-
nical writer for Boeing before teaching English and creative writing at
the University of Montana in Missoula. ‘I hate that phrase “the real
world”,’ he writes in The Triggering Town (1979). ‘Why is an aircraft
factory more real than a university? Is it?’ Hugo pointed out that in
his office on campus he had had intense conversations with ex-convicts
on parole, people recently released from mental hospitals, drug addicts
and young people in great emotional distress. ‘In some ways,’ he writes,
‘the university is a far more real world than business.’10
The belief that universities need to prepare students for a ‘real world’
of which they are not part is itself an example of what the humanities
explore: the human capacity to make meaning. The humanities study
the meaning-making creations of humanity: art, music, literature,
language, religion, history and philosophy. But their broader concern
is this compulsion to make meaning out of our lives. They study, in its
largest sense, storytelling – that borderless coin with which all humans
trade.
Storytelling happens everywhere, including within academic disci-
plines. Economics, for instance, has long considered itself the queen of
the social sciences – that is, the most scientific. And yet rival economists
persist in telling very different stories about how the world works. In re-
cent decades, economics has been dominated by the story that we are
homo economicus: little autonomous bundles of self-interest and ratio-
nal choice. This story has proved inadequate as a way of understanding
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the world after the 2008 financial crash. The crash was sparked by the
failure of mathematical models which turned out to be stories that
humans were telling themselves about how the world worked. The crash
confirmed that the economy is in part an imaginative entity, a product of
unmodellable phenomena such as groupthink, faddishness and market
confidence. In the age of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, it should
be clearer than ever that money is a human abstraction, a stand-in for
value rather than value itself, a story we agree amongst ourselves – at
least until we lose faith in it, and see how scarily it is built on the
shifting sands of mass belief.
The economist Yannis Varoufakis has credited Shakespeare with
teaching him the folly of rational choice theory and of his fellow econo-
mists’ belief that they were the scientists of society. Shakespearean
characters, he found, were complex and conflicted, not reducible to a ‘cal-
culus of utility, passion, preference or desire’. Shakespeare’s tragedies
taught him that oppressors and exploiters often become ‘enslaved by
their own insecurity, paranoia and, in the end, induced incompetence’.
Seemingly rational systems like capitalism can ‘enslav[e] everyone, rich
and poor, capitalist and worker, wasting human and natural
resources’.11
Much of human reality is intersubjective – a product of collective
meaning-making. The humanities, Yuhal Noah Harari writes, ‘empha-
sise the crucial importance of intersubjective entities, which cannot be
reduced to hormones and neurons’.12 The success of the human species,
Harari argues, comes from our ability to weave these intersubjective
webs of meaning, made up of languages, laws, religions, customs,
rituals, nations and identities. The price we pay for this ability is that
these same fictions become self-validating and erase other realities.
Immersed as we are in their symbolic universes, we cannot break their
spell of meaning. We mistake their intersubjective abstractions for con-
crete, incontestable truths. As Harari points out, emerging technologies
are likely to make such collective fictions even more powerful. Biotech-
nology – such as xenotransplantation, gene therapy and genome modifi-
cation – will force us to think about where the human begins and ends.
Physical geography will coexist more and more with human-made cyber-
space and virtual worlds. Data science will imagine humans as having
meaning and value mainly as part of the data flow. New technologies
are changing the stories we tell about ourselves.
The humanities show us how to read these stories with imaginative
sympathy and watchful scepticism, by teasing out the assumptions un-
derneath. What does it mean to be human in a techno-humanist age,
and is it healthy to believe that we can transcend our evolutionary past
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as weak, dependent, mortal animals? What is economic growth for, and
has it become an end in itself rather than a means to an end? Why is
work held up as a moral good? What is the ‘real world’ and why must
we bend to its immovable certainties? How do we live a good, meaningful
life?
Science and the Humanities
In a more than sixty-year career, the American biologist Edward O.
Wilson has been a great evangelist for science. And yet in The Meaning
of Human Existence (2014) he claims that, if the earth were ever visited
by aliens, our species would have one thing worthy of their attention: the
humanities. Science, he argues, derives general laws from reproducible
experiments. Its truths thus apply everywhere in the universe, regard-
less of who discovered them. Aliens who have arrived from millions of
light years away may be scientifically millions of years ahead of us, in
which case our scientists would not be able to tell them much they don’t
know already.13 What would intrigue these hyper-evolved aliens is the
humanities, ‘the natural history of culture, and our most private and
precious heritage’. The sword of science, Wilson writes, ‘cuts paths
through the fever swamp of human existence’.14 The humanities do
the opposite. They explore how we live in that swamp and extract mean-
ing from its muddy, mosquito-ridden and stagnant water. They study
human culture in all its intricacy and idiosyncrasy.
Science searches for useful simplifications that reduce complex phe-
nomena to fundamental principles. It breaks up the multifaceted world
into its constituent parts – brains into neurons, neurons into molecules,
molecules into atoms. Then it isolates and examines them separately to
devise helpful explanations. Once science understood that the basic unit
of life, the gene, is a macro-molecule, deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), for
instance, it could start to explain life’s mysteries through the simpler
laws of chemistry. Science is sometimes accused of being ‘reductionist’
– often by humanities scholars, for whom a reductive interpretation of
a text is one that collapses its complexity into a false simplicity. But in
science, reductionism is all. Science explains by excluding from its remit
things which are just as much part of reality but not essential to that
particular explanation. Scientists don’t deny the existence of this more
complex reality; they just clear it away, for now, so that some general
rule can be revealed. Science pares down with Occam’s razor until it
finds its own kind of truth. Hence the quest for the beautiful economy
of an equation – the formula that will explain a lot with as little effort
as possible.
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Science, not the humanities, is the realm of beauty. Whatever
Bellow’s hero feared, the humanities will never be decorative wallpaper,
because there is nothing especially decorative about them. The art, mu-
sic, writing and thought they examine may well be beautiful. But if
you’re looking for beauty per se, you’d be better off studying number the-
ory. A pure mathematician will tell you that what really excites them is
the search for a beautiful proof: perfectly balanced, sparely elegant,
thrillingly inevitable, free of all flab and excrescence. Theoretical physi-
cists also tend to believe that the first requirement of an equation is that
it be beautiful. For them, natural symmetry and honed brevity are the
straightest road to scientific truth, the formula most likely to stand up
to experimental validation.15
You can get that kind of mathematical perfection from a Bach can-
tata, I suppose, music being the art form most like mathematics. But
more often, the texts we study in the humanities are as cross-grained,
richly woven and fascinatingly flawed as the humans who made them.
Martha Nussbaum argues that, just as athletic achievement ‘has point
and value only relatively to the context of the human body’, so other
human achievements are inevitably measured against our built-in
constraints. ‘Human limits structure the human excellences, and give
excellent action its significance,’ she writes.16 The humanities explore
the work not of divinely inspired demigods, but of human beings work-
ing within their human limits. Like Usain Bolt running 100 metres in
9.58 seconds, these artefacts feel like virtuosic but imperfect
achievements.
Humanities scholars also work within these human limits. Only a
small amount of our work can be roboticised or technologically
enhanced. To study human artefacts, we use human skills: looking, lis-
tening, speaking, reading and writing. This makes the humanities
harder to justify to those who think that universities should prepare
us for the ‘real world’, because they draw on accessible aptitudes that
are already part of that world. Most people can look, listen, speak, read
and write. But in the humanities we learn that these skills are more
complex and difficult than we think.
Words today are cheaply available. The technology of mobile devices
and online interactivity has invaded almost every public and
private space with our declarations and revelations. A pervasive
techno-libertarian ethos supposes it healthy and cathartic for us to be
forever sharing our thoughts with the world. If you time-travelled even
just thirty years into the past, you would be struck by how little writing
was happening outside of the classroom. There would be no one sat in
coffee shops stabbing their laptops urgently with two fingers; no
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students texting slyly in class under their desks; no one updating the so-
cial network with news of their lives. Writing then was mostly
outsourced to professionals and meant to be read much later than it
was written. Nowadays most writing is for rapid release and response,
a slightly interrupted way of having a conversation.
Jodi Dean uses the term ‘communicative capitalism’ to describe this
new world in which the main commodity is messages constantly
circulating.17 The specific sender or receiver of a message is less impor-
tant than its contribution to the data flow. Its use value is secondary to
its exchange value as part of the ever-expanding pool of information.
Every message becomes ‘content’, the abstract, uncountable noun that
refers to anything uploaded onto a platform that can be shared across
that and other platforms. Advertising-revenue-driven algorithms push
the most shareable (and often the noisiest and most shocking) content.
In The World of Silence (1948), the Swiss theologian Max Picard writes
of noise as this kind of endless onward flow, its only demand being that
it should go on uninterrupted. ‘Words have become merely signs that
something is being fetched out of the jumble of noise and thrown at
the listener,’ he argues. ‘[…] The noise never dares to stop – as if it were
afraid that it might disappear if it were not always to be occupying the
whole of space.’18
As words proliferate, they are used more profligately. Communica-
tive capitalism has little interest in the rhetorical power of language,
its ability to reshape reality and change how we think. Words are seen
only as a transparent conduit for thought. A politician, caught out say-
ing something unguarded, apologises for their ‘poor choice of words’ –
as though words were just a light dusting of salt on the meat of mean-
ing, and not that important. The humanities scholar knows that words
are not a condiment but the marinade that alters the taste of every-
thing. They know that the world is created partly through words. This
teaches them to be sceptical of current iterations of reality and tolerant
of other perspectives. If life can be differently articulated, it can be
differently lived.
We have come to think of reading as a mere competency, a matter of
just scanning a text and computing the words. To take something ‘as
read’ means to assume something without further discussion. And yet
in its first sense the Old English rædan meant to advise, deliberate or
consider.Unready, the epithet of Ethelred II, meant poorly advised, lack-
ing good counsel. The humanities see reading as, in Julian Barnes’s
phrase, ‘a majority skill but a minority art’.19 To read in the humanities
means to come up with our own exact and singular reading of a text.
Since every reading is unique, it can never be a definitive statement,
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but must be inspired by and feed into other readings, and be prepared to
inspire its own.
In the humanities there is a theoretically limitless number of read-
ings. Science’s insights stem, by contrast, from its self-limitations. It
confines itself to aspects of the mechanical or biological world that can
be clearly established, or at least that can be the subject of falsifiable
theories. It tries to eliminate human subjectivity from its calculations,
in search of what Karl Popper called ‘knowledge without a knower’.20
Take one great early scientific discovery: Johannes Kepler’s first law of
planetary motion which, along with Galileo’s work, began to create an
alternative physics to that of Aristotle and Ptolemy. Kepler wasted a
great deal of time trying to reconcile his mentor Tycho Brahe’s observa-
tions of Mars with a circular orbit. Like everyone else, he did not find the
idea that planets move in ellipses aesthetically agreeable. He clung to
the story of circular orbits.
The accuracy of Tycho’s astronomical measurements forced Kepler to
abandon the ‘divine’ conception of the circle and consider the ‘ugly’ el-
lipse. Ptolemy’s model of the universe had satisfied the human desire
for neat circularity, but the universe was not so obliging. Kepler had to
confront his human biases with the non-human evidence. To know scien-
tifically, he wrote, is to ‘shak[e] off the deceptions of eyesight’.21 His 1605
proof that the orbit of Mars is an ellipse demonstrated the power of sci-
entific abstraction: it relied entirely on Euclid’s geometry of straight
lines and circles. Kepler had reduced the movement of the spheres to a
mathematical calculation.
Compare Kepler’s work with that of a slightly earlier figure: the
polymath John Dee. Perhaps the most widely read man of his time, he
had one of the largest libraries in sixteenth-century England. He was
an expert in Copernican astronomy, Euclidean geometry and cartogra-
phy. But he also believed in astrology, alchemy and crystallomancy,
and in the possibility of summoning angels through seances, mirrors
and occult codes. For all his brilliance and erudition, Dee left behind
no great scientific discovery, because he had neither the talent nor incli-
nation for reductionism. His life and work are now mainly of interest to
humanities scholars exploring the intellectual and cultural history of
the early modern era.
The scientific method, with its objective standards of evidence and
reduction to first principles, has immense explanatory power. It feels es-
pecially worth defending today, when so much public discourse resorts
to ad hominem arguments and dismisses evidence and expertise. Online
discussion often deteriorates into abuse because people take being chal-
lenged so personally. Arguments feel like emotional investments and
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critique like an attack. Science teaches us detachment, how to separate
reality from our own beliefs and desires. ‘Of course we see in a glass
darkly,’ as the economist J.R. Sargent put it, ‘but at least we should stop
it getting it clouded by our breath.’22
The humanities aspire to a different kind of rigour. They can never
erase the human from their calculations, because they study the whole
chaotic business of human meaning-making. They can’t reduce things
to their essentials as science does, because they examine artefacts that
are all unique, having each emerged from the most complex object in
the known universe, the human brain. The American poet Donald Hall
defines a poem as ‘human inside talking to human inside’.23 The same
might be said of any text or artefact studied in the humanities. Since
human inside can’t literally talk to human inside, every attempt to do
so will be a uniquely intriguing failure.
Artificial intelligence has already begun to exceed the basic comput-
ing power of the human brain. But it has come nowhere near to replicat-
ing the brain’s anarchic non-computability, the human gift for being
both brilliantly stupid and stupidly brilliant all at once. Adam Gopnik
calls it ‘standard-issue human perversity’.24 The humanities deal with
this muddled, contradictory, non-abstractable state of being human.
Humanities research now often takes place in ‘labs’: arts labs, litera-
ture labs, history labs. This linguistic borrowing from the ascendant
sciences is meant to make humanities scholarship sound purposeful,
methodical and busy. It has a long pedigree. ‘When a professor of history
calls his “seminar” a “laboratory”, is he not wilfully expatriating himself
from his natural environment?’ asked Arnold Toynbee in A Study of
History (1934). The historian’s seminarium, for Toynbee, was not a
laboratory but ‘a nursery-garden in which living ideas about living crea-
tures are taught to shoot’.25
Calling any place of humanities research a ‘lab’ may be a useful
branding exercise, but it is a category error that betrays a loss of confi-
dence about what the humanities do. Science needs laboratories, be-
cause it proceeds by doing experiments under controlled conditions.
These laboratory conditions remove the distorting signal of human sub-
jectivity and other unreproducible factors that might affect the results.
The humanities don’t distil and purify in this way; they translate, inter-
pret and explain. Instead of abstracting and universalising, they enrich
and particularise. In the humanities, explanations and examples multi-
ply because the human conversation about what our lives mean never
ends. Instead of a laboratory, a humanities scholar needs a library. They
know that somewhere in those miles of bookshelves, either physical or
virtual, lies the answer, or the question, they are seeking – albeit framed
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differently, in another place and time, by someone trying to make their
own sense of being human.
Every humanities scholar, whatever their discipline or period, is a
historian of human culture. One of their tasks is to unearth the rich ar-
chive of human contingency in a way that undermines the trite general-
ities and misleading myths of lazier forms of public memory. The
humanities scholar knows that the past is too complex and sui generis
for us to draw facile parallels with the present. Hitler’s appeasers tell
us little about how to behave towards Islamic terrorists; the Hundred
Years’ War offers no easy insights into our current relationship with
Europe; the history of the British Empire gives us few clues as to what
life will be like after Brexit. Instead the humanities scholar uses the
past to make us aware of possibilities we have not considered, and other
ways to live that we have forgotten. ‘The past is full not of dead things
but of unfinished business: germs of fruitful routes as yet untravelled,’
David Gange argues. ‘Every coastal ruin whose living cultures were once
steamrollered by the homogenising logics of industrial capitalism is a
site at which the possibilities for an escape from those logics can be
entertained.’26
By preserving and curating past human cultures, the humanities
serve as an antidote to the hubris of presentism. One example of such
presentism is how often policy makers use medieval history as an illus-
tration of the irrelevance of the humanities to the modern world. In May
2003 the education secretary, Charles Clarke, claimed to have been
misquoted when he was reported to have told an audience at University
College Worcester: ‘I don’t mind there being some medievalists around
for ornamental purposes. But there is no reason for the state to pay for
them.’ Clarke said that he had referred only to an old-fashioned view
of the university as ‘the medieval concept of a community of scholars
seeking truth’. He argued that this was a poor rationale for requesting
state support.27
In May 2016 Patrick Johnston, vice-chancellor of Queen’s University
Belfast, was not so nuanced when he told the Belfast Telegraph: ‘Society
doesn’t need a 21-year-old who is a sixth-century historian.’ It needed,
he said, ‘someone who has the potential to help society drive forward’.28
In January 2018 the MP Robert Halfon, chair of the Commons select
committee on education, called for discounted student fees for degrees
in subjects that addressed skills shortages in healthcare, construction,
engineering or digital industries where ‘we are way behind’. ‘If someone
wants to do medieval history, that’s fine,’ Halfon said. ‘But all the incen-
tives from government and so on should go to areas the country needs
and will bring it most benefit.’29
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It helps these arguments that the word ‘medieval’ itself connotes a
risible primitivism. When Donald Trump declared in his 2016 election
campaign that ‘waterboarding is absolutely fine but we should go much
further’, he explained that ‘we’re living in medieval times’ and were
fighting ‘violent people, vicious people’.30 Trump’s words feed into long
associations of medieval society with irrationalism and barbarism – a
rhetoric used most recently against Al-Qaida and Islamic State.
Medieval historians have challenged this polarised view that sets the
dark ages against enlightened modernity. Rory Cox argues that in the
medieval era what we now call ‘waterboarding’ was thought worse than
other forms of torture such as flogging and the leg screw. Cox finds refer-
ences to waterboard-like torture – pouring water over the face of the su-
pine victim and using a cloth to stuff the mouth and nostrils, to induce
the sensation of drowning – in European legal treatises from the late
fourteenth century onwards. It was viewed as a severe torture technique,
and jurists, city states and kingdoms only sanctioned torture in extreme
cases anyway. Cox’s account challenges the idea of torture as something
that medieval barbarians indulged in for sadistic reasons, and questions
the post-9/11 reframing of waterboarding as ‘torture lite’.31 It is a model
of how the humanities can address the fallacies of presentism.
Most of us suffer to some degree from this condescension towards the
past, the unthinking assumption that our ancestors were naïve and
backward compared to us. ‘The modern mind longs for the future as
the medieval mind longed for Heaven,’ writes Wendell Berry in The
Unsettling of America. What Berry calls this ‘strange, almost occult
yearning for the future’32 is evident in the current phrase ‘going forward’
(or its now more common and vigorous variants, ‘moving forward’ and
‘driving forward’). The language of managerialism is one of perpetual
movement: of change management, continuous enhancement, action
points and direction of travel. It calls to mind the French theorist Henri
Lefebvre’s definition of modernisation as ‘the movement which justifies
its own existence merely by moving’.33
The humanities scholar knows that we are neither so wise nor so
radical as this, and that most things have been thought before. They
propose that, rather than move blindly into the future, we draw on that
vast human heritage of creative insight – not so much to check that we
are moving in the right direction as to clarify that there is no single,
clean line into the future. Science moves forward, proceeding by
increments along its cutting edge; but the humanities are cumulative,
not linear. By telling stories to interpret other stories, and analysing
words by using more words, they pursue illuminating complication
rather than science’s beautiful simplicity. They layer on meaning and
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erudition, enlarging bit by bit on the conversation begun tens of thou-
sands of years ago when Homo sapiens went deep into caves to blow
ochre dye on the walls.
The Humanities and the Human
This long search for meaning in human life is heroic because it is so at
war with the scientific evidence. Science, quite rightly from a scientific
viewpoint, says that human beings don’t much matter. What does a
single human life amount to in the context of a 13.8-billion-year-old uni-
verse, which contains dozens of galaxies (at least) for every one of the
nearly 8 billion people alive? Humanness to a scientist is a matter of
degree, because it arrived piecemeal, via evolution, over huge tranches
of time. Palaeoanthropology demonstrates how fuzzy is the line in the
fossil record that separates Homo sapiens from other hominids or
Australopithecines. Now that we know that Neanderthals cared for sick
and disabled members of their tribe, mourned their dead and had larger
brains than ours, and now that the genome record has revealed
Neanderthal DNA in Homo sapiens, we must revise our sense of our
own specialness. To label someone boorish and uncivilised as
‘Neanderthal’ is yet more presentism.
Primatology shows us that apes are like us, except for relatively mi-
nor modifications like erect bipedalism and greater cranial capacity.
Ethology shows us that other animals have behaviour patterns that
might seem as sophisticated as our own were we to understand them
fully. A migratory bird has an internal guidance system more subtle
than satnav, and a pair of whooping cranes has, in the words of the
ecocritic Joseph Meeker, ‘a courtship and sex life at least as complicated
as Romeo and Juliet’s’.34 Neuroscience shows us that everything that
comprises the essential human self – mind, soul, personality, spirit –
is housed in that hunk of animal matter, a brain. The emerging fields
of biotechnology and artificial intelligence show us that our idea of the
human may soon incorporate the robotic and the algorithmic. Science
has established that all the walls we have built between ourselves and
other animals to prove our uniqueness – comprised of qualities like emo-
tion, culture, language and play – are porous and permeable.
To a scientist we are worth no more or less than other forms of life.
We are loose arrangements of carbon-based matter stirred into collec-
tive action for a few short years. A scientist can put a price on a human
body. They can add up the market value of the organic matter, minerals
and trace elements and give you a price for the lot. It usually comes to a
few thousand pounds. Economics is more generous in its evaluations. It
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can compute the statistical value of a single life, to quantify a wrongful
death claim or help decide whether to pay for a medical procedure or a
piece of public infrastructure. For instance, if the statistical value of a
single life is three million pounds, then a road improvement that would
save one life must cost no more than this. The value of a statistical life
factors in variables like age, life expectancy, current salary, earning
potential and number of dependants. An affluent young person has a
more valuable life, statistically, than a poor, old person. The poorest
Londoner has a more valuable life than someone from Mogadishu.
But this isn’t really how we respond to the riveting puzzle of selfhood,
or how we feel when someone we love dies. Stephen Hawking might
have been scientifically right when he said that humans were ‘a
chemical scum floating on the surface of a moderate-sized planet’.35 In
practice, though, we can’t live our lives believing this. Kenneth R.
Feinberg, the special master of the federal fund set up to compensate
the families of victims of 9/11, conceded that he could not ultimately
calculate how much each of the victims’ lives was worth. ‘You’d have to
be a rabbi or a priest to try to answer that,’ he said.36 Stripped of the
thin veneer of civilisation we may be, as King Lear says, ‘no more but
such a poor, bare, fork’d animal’. But still, we are priceless to ourselves
and each other. Against all empirical evidence to the contrary, the hu-
manities speak to this human need to imagine ourselves as irreplace-
able – as what John Berger calls ‘offal with flecks in it of the divine’.37
About ten years ago, a new word started to appear in English stu-
dents’ essays. Holden Caulfield is a relatable character, they would
write, or his situation is relatable. This voguish word says much about
our current demand that texts should be relevant, engaging and mirror
our own experiences. The humanities scholar should introduce those
students to the unrelatable – to texts that may discomfort and even bore
them with their weirdness and difficulty. These texts will enlighten
them about other human presences, distant and different from their
own, that burn or burned as brightly and fiercely as theirs. The human-
ities are an ongoing lesson in otherness, in the infinite mystery and irre-
ducibility of every human life. ‘Human diversity is literature’s lock and
stock, as well as its raison d’être,’ Joseph Brodsky writes. ‘Literature is
the greatest – surely greater than any creed – teacher of human
subtlety.’38 Texts studied in the humanities reveal both the granular
particularity of each human mind and body, and the delicate, branching
connections of shared meaning that link humans together. This paradox
of the human condition – that we are unique, isolated consciousnesses
and needy, mimetic, social beings – is the central preoccupation of hu-
man culture and of the humanities.
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In her memoir In the Days of Rain, Rebecca Stott writes about grow-
ing up in the Exclusive Brethren, a Christian fundamentalist sect who
kept themselves entirely separate from non-Brethren (‘worldlies’), be-
lieving that they alone would be saved by the Rapture. Non-Brethren
were seen as less than human. Brethren couldn’t even share party walls
with them, and they were not allowed television, newspapers, radios or
books other than the Bible. Having freed herself from the cult, Stott
went on to study English and Art History at the University of York. In
her second year she read Charles Darwin and George Eliot and they
gave her a new way of seeing. They taught her about the invisible web
of intersubjective meanings and evolutionary inheritances that united
humanity. When she became pregnant, she thought ‘of the child growing
inside my womb and that miraculous network of neural pathways
forming in both his new brain and my older one. We were all “netted to-
gether”, just as Darwin had said. Everything we did had an effect on the
people around us.’39
This idea, that every life is both inestimably valuable in itself and
part of a common humanity, is enshrined in most religions and the mod-
ern concept of human rights. And yet evidence lies all around us that
some human lives matter less than others. How otherwise could we tol-
erate the reality of a refugee’s dead body washed up on a Mediterranean
coast, or found in a flimsy, drifting dinghy, or sold by human traffickers
to harvest its corneas, liver and kidneys for sale on the organ black mar-
ket? We tolerate it because on some level we see these human beings as
less fully human than us.
Judith Butler uses the term ‘grievability’ to account for some human
deaths being more mourned, or even noticed, than others. Grievability
relies on exclusory notions of the human: if your death is not as
grievable, then your life was less worth living.40 The ‘black lives matter’
movement arose out of the injustice of unequal grievability – a sense
that black lives are disposable or stripped of value, and that when black
men die in custody it is as if ‘someone who never existed has been nulli-
fied, so nothing has happened’.41 Butler argues that the role of the hu-
manities is to reinsert the human into where we have forgotten it
exists – ‘to return us to the human where we do not expect to find it,
in its frailty and at the limits of its capacity to make sense’.42
We forget the human exists when we become too attached to certain
kinds of story. The humanities teach us that stories can be toxic as well
as liberating, that they can entrap us as well as enchant us, or entrap us
because they enchant us. We find some stories so compelling that we get
hung up on them, and do not notice how they turn other people into an-
tagonists or bit-part players – or leave them out of the story altogether.
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‘We think we tell stories, but stories often tell us, tell us to love or to
hate, to see or to be blind,’ Rebecca Solnit writes. ‘Often, too often,
stories saddle us, ride us, whip us onward, tell us what to do, and we
do it without questioning.’43
Much of Solnit’s work has explored how masculine power gets to tell
its own unchallenged story in a way that silences other stories. We have
learnt recently that the most shocking things can seem normal – until
there is a ‘me too’ or a ‘time’s up’ moment and suddenly what seemed
normal seems grotesque. The usual response to such paradigm shifts
is to blame people in the recent past for normalising what now seems in-
supportable. But we should be careful not to acquit ourselves too readily
of the same human weakness for overinvesting in stories.
By untangling the stories we tell and the words we use to tell them,
the humanities scholar shows that all of us are fully human. In this com-
mitment to our miscellaneous and capacious humanness, the humani-
ties run counter to the desiccated professional discourse of modern life.
A verbless, noun-ridden, self-proving language – the language of deliver-
ables, competencies, milestones and functionality – has become the argot
of modern managerialism. It is the language of a financialised capital-
ism that sees human capital as a faceless element in a process and a
fixed cost to be reduced. Inside this language, anything can be claimed
and nothing can be felt. No one says who did what to whom, or takes
ownership or the blame. In order to seem rational and reasonable, it
avoids mentioning any inconveniently actual, living humans. Because
it sounds so boringly sane and incontrovertible, it can make the execra-
ble seem routine, by burying it in euphemisms such as collateral
damage, extraordinary rendition or enhanced interrogation techniques.
This deadened, indifferent attitude to language is what makes many
people in public life sound so dull and vacuous. ‘Every time I hear a po-
litical speech or I read those of our leaders,’ a young Albert Camus wrote
in his diary in August 1937, ‘I am horrified at having, for years, heard
nothing which sounded human.’ He called these leaders ‘hollow
clowns’44 – an apt way to describe how desensitised language empties
us out and makes us feel unreal and unhuman to each other. The hu-
manities remind us of the flawed, messy, inimitable humanity behind
the metric-driven, quasi-rationalistic, monotone world evoked by
managerialism.
Managerialism colludes with a techno-consumerism that also denies
our full humanity by treating us as data or purchase points. This tech-
nology addresses us with words detached from any recognisable human
source: disembodied announcements that apologise for any inconve-
nience caused, or tell us over on-hold music that our call is important,
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or ask us to confirm that we are not a robot. Most banking transactions
now take place without any human intervention at all. Much of what
was once human activity, from shopping to diagnosing illnesses, is
offloaded to apps and algorithms. Social media companies see users as
data to be harvested and units to be targeted by advertisers, a process
conducted by computer code. The humanities point to the voluminously
human world that exists outside this virtual, algorithmic one – and to
the fact that these algorithms are themselves human creations.
This does not mean that humanities scholarship will make us more
emotionally literate or empathetic, or care more than a scientist does
about human life in all its richness. Scientists get rightly irritated by
any suggestion that the essential reductionism of their work blinds
them to this deeper reality. A neuroscientist is no less captivated by
the mysteries of consciousness just because they know that they are
all held within that three-pound lump of jellified fat and protein inside
our skulls. A geneticist values human life no less for being able to
glimpse its makeup in DNA’s double helix. Medical students often ac-
quire a great respect for the cadavers they work on, a shared sense of
the preciousness of life and the dignity and solidarity of death.
Even as science trains a harsh light on our own insignificance, it of-
fers solace. Its technologies and prescriptions extend our lives and
lessen their pain. Its insatiable curiosity about our tiny place in the
universe is an end and pleasure in itself. And it can inspire a poetic, diz-
zying, consoling awareness of our own smallness, such as when powerful
space telescopes capture the austere beauty of nebulae and spiral galax-
ies or the mind-bending unreality of black holes. But science can’t do the
one thing that the humanities can: show that human lives, in all their
brevity, confusion, grief and joy, are meaningful. In Clifford Geertz’s
words, ‘man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself
has spun’.45 Only inside that web of self-spun meaning do our lives seem
to matter.
The humanities are both chastening and heartening. They are chas-
tening because they demonstrate that human potential is limited by
the meanings we make and the stories we tell each other. They reveal
us to be error-prone and self-sabotaging animals, acquiring ever more
knowledge and yet failing to learn from it because we underestimate
our ability to delude ourselves and each other. They alert us to the
strangeness and cussedness of all human lives, and our propensity to
be seduced and blindsided by the stories we tell.
And yet the humanities are also heartening. They suggest that, even
within these limitations, human beings are endlessly inventive and re-
sourceful. The humanities began in the creative ferment of the
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Renaissance, with its rediscovery of the secular accomplishments of
classical civilisation. The studia humanitatis were a hymn to the full-
ness of human potential. The humanities show that the highest human
achievements occur when people trust in their own human skills, and
when they act as if their lives, and the lives of those around them,
matter.
The humanities remain a resilient and perhaps inextinguishable hu-
man impulse. Anxieties about funding cuts and falling student numbers
are real. But as Irina Dumitrescu argues, the humanities are practised
beyond the university and they have survived in the worst circum-
stances – of war, imprisonment, censorship and tyranny. Dumitrescu
has examined how Romanian political prisoners under the Ceauseşcu
regime created a clandestine university of the humanities behind bars.
They shared poetry with each other in Morse code, by tapping, coughing
or moving their chairs so that they squeaked. They formed study groups,
teaching each other the plots of novels frommemory. They learnt foreign
languages by rubbing bottles with soap to improvise a scratchable writ-
ing surface. (After their release, some of these prisoners became profes-
sional translators.) One incarcerated professor of English wrote his
lectures on string, tying knots for each letter.46 The prisoners’ love of
the liberal arts was a way of retaining their dignity and humanity in a
situation designed to destroy them. The humanities exist wherever hu-
man beings congregate and try to do more than simply survive.
Human potential can’t always be mapped on to skills gaps we have
already decided we need to plug; often, it can only be fathomed when
it has been fulfilled.
Some will say that this is a naive and retrograde view of education
and scholarship, unattuned to the ‘real world’. But that is another story
they have told themselves – convincing enough, as all stories are, within
its own self-contained bubble of meaning. What drew you to the human-
ities in the first place was that you were not quite sold on that story, nor
convinced that it told you all you could know about human potential.
You are still not sold on it. So I’m afraid that you are a humanities
scholar, whether you (or they) like it or not.
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